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RECENT CASE NOTES
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONSTrTUTIONALrrY OF PARKING METERS-Action
by the owner of property adjoining a street to enjoin the installation and main-
tenance of parking meters in front of the plaintiff's premises. The village pro-
posed to install the meters by virtue of express authority conferred by state
statute. Plaintiff contends that the statute is an unconstitutional deprivation of
his rights as abutting owner, and an improper and invalid exercise of the
police power. Held: injunction denied. The statute is a proper exercise of
the police power for the regulation of traffic. Gilsey Buildings, Inc. v.
Village of Great Neck Plaza (N. Y. 1939), 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 694.
The spread of the parking meter device has produced considerable con-
troversy over the constitutionality of meter legislation. Search has revealed
seven cases (one an advisory opinion) on the subject; with but one exception,
the validity of the acts has been upheld.1
Analysis of the opinions shows that three essential problems are raised, to-
wit: (1) whether the ordinance is a reasonable exercise of the police power
of the municipal corporation with respect to the rights of the traveling public;
(2) whether it is a reasonable exercise of the police power with respect to
the rights of abutting owners; and (3) whether it is an improper use of the
police power for revenue purposes.
The public has a primary right to use the streets for travel which does not
include the "right" to park.2 The primary right is often called the "right
to the free use of the street" or "a right of free and unobstructed passage."$
Even this right of passage is subordinate to reasonable regulations of the
municipality for the public good.4 Secondary to this right of passage is the
privilege of each citizen to use the street for individual purposes, subject to
reasonable regulations for the benefit of the public.5. Parking is included
within this category. Being but a matter of privilege and not of right, it may
be entirely prohibited in the regulation and control of traffic8 and the preven-
tion of congestion.7 However, it must be remembered that not every stopping
of a car can be considered as parking; there are certain additional rights
called "rights incidental to public travel" inherent to the primary right of
passage. The most common of these are the rights to load or unload merchandise
or the stopping at the curb to take in or let out passengers.8 Unless a
1 Constitutional: State v. McCarthy (1936), 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314; Ex
Parte Duncan (1937), 179 Okla. 355, 65 P. (2d) 1016; Harper v. City of
Wichita Falls (Texas 1937), 105 S. W. (2d) 743; Ex Parte Harrison (Texas
1939), 122 S. W. (2d) 314; Clark v. City of Newcastle (1939), 32 D. & C. 371,
30 Mun. 65 (Pa. Com. Pl.); In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass. 1937), 8 N. E.
(2d) 179.
Unconstitutional: Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co. (1937), 233
Ala. 352, 172 So. 114.
2 Willis, Constitutional Law, p. 748: "The free use of streets does not
include the privilege of parking autos on the streets."
8 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911), Sec. 1163.
4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928), Sec. 1496.
5 Harper v. City of Wichita Falls (Texas 1937), 105 S. W. (2d) 743.
6Pugh v. Des Moines (1916), 176 Iowa 593, 156 N. W. 892; Welsh v. City
of Morris (1928), 98 N. J. L. 630, 121 A. 699; Chicago v. McKinley (1931),
344 Ill. 297, 176 N. E. 261; Ex Parte Corvey (1926), 220 Mo. App. 602, 287
S. W. 879.
7 Ex Parte Duncan (1937), 179 Okla. 356, 65 P. (2d) 1016.
8 In re Corvey (1926), 220 Mo. App. 602, 287 S. W. 879; Lowell :v. Pendle-
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meter ordinance excepts these it may fall afoul of constitutional difficulties.
Since the city may pass measures to prevent congestion to carry out the primary
function of the street, it is submitted that a meter ordinance is not an unrea-
sonable inerference with the public's right to use the street.
Whether there is a reasonable exercise of the police power with respect
to the rights of abutting owners is our next question. An abutter has the
right of access or ingress and egress to his property;9 he has the right regard-
less of whether the fee of the street lies in the municipality or in the abutting
owner.
1 0 His rights do not depend upon any express grant of power from the
municipality but arise by operation of law."3 This right is a right to use the
street as a means of ingress and egress; it does not include the privilege of
parking.12 Like other members of the public, the right of an abutting owner
to use the street is subject to regulatory measures for the public good.1 He
cannot object to reasonable regulations carrying out the primary purpose of
the streets1 4 nor is any regulation unreasonable because it restrains his rights
or may result in incidental loss to him.15 True, the Alabama court in invalidat-
ing a meter ordinance held that an abutting owner had the right to keep his
property free of physical obstruction;15a but the cases show that there may
be placed upon an abutter's property light poles1 6 and lines, 1 7 telegraph and
gas lines 1 8 and recently it was held that a fire alarm box was not an unrea-
sonable burden of the right of the abutter.19 The Alabama contention does
not seem well taken.
A meter ordinance then would not be an unreasonable infringement of
the rights of an abutting owner. Our noted case so holds.19a
The last possible basis of successful attack is that a meter ordinance is
really an improper use of police power to raise money. So much money is
taken in from the meters above operating cost and initial expense that the
issue is a troublesome one. In Florida revenues in ten months were $55,000
with expenses of $4,000;20 in Oklahoma City the cost ran about eight per
ton Auto Co. (1927), 123 Ore. 383, 261 P. 414; Wonewoc v. Taubert (1930),
203 Wis. 73, 233 N. W. 756.
9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. 1928), Sec. 1426; other rights
of the abutter include: (2) right tb light and air; (3) right of view; (4) right
to have a street kept open as a public street; (5) whatever adds to the value
of the street to the abutter. Elevated Railway cases; Sfreet Railway v. N. Y.
Elev. Ry. (1881), 90 N. Y. 122; John v. Metropolitan Elev. Ry. (1882), 104
N. Y. 268, 10 N. E. 528.
loIn re Olinger (1914), 160 App Div. 96, 145 N. Y. S. 174; Davis v.
Spragg (1913), 72 W. Va. 672, 79 S. E. 652.
11 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911), Sec. 1125.
12 State v. Burkett (1913), 119 Md. 609, 87 A. 514.
1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911), Sec. 1429.
14 Park Hotel Co. v. Ketchum (1924), 184 Wis. 182, 199 N. W. 129.
15 Lombardo v. Dallas (1934), 124 Tex. 1, 73 S. W. (2d) 476.
l5aBirmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co. (1937), 233 Ala. 352, 172
So. 114.
16 People v. Williams (1917), 100 Misc. Rep. 569, 166 N. Y. S. 560.
17 Fox v. City of Hinton (1919), 84 W. Va. 239, 99 S. E. 478.
18 Sorg v. Village of Oak Harbor (1925), 20 Ohio App. 313, 151 N. E. 800.
19 Centebor v. Watertown (1929), 268 Mass. 121, 167 N. E. 303.
19SGilsey v. Great Neck Plaza (April 1, 1939), N. Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau
City.
20 American City, Aug. 1936, p. 59.
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cent, of the intake.2 ' However, a court desiring to uphold the acts can adopt
the attitude and language of the court in Florida 'v. McCarthy,22 where it
refused to say that the meter act was a tax measure under guise of the police
power. It explained away the over plus as "incidental revenue."
The black-letter rule is of course that the police power is the power to
regulate and may not be used for the purpose of raising revenue.23 The broad
proviso is made, however, that the fact that incidental revenue arises will
not invalidate a police measure; so long as revenues exceed costs by only
a reasonable margin the act is valid.24 Cooley says that under a police measure
a fee may be exacted which is not more than the (1) necessary or probable
expense of supplying the privilege and (2) of inspecting and regulating the
business it covers.25 Unless there can be included the cost of marking lanes,
cleaning the space, and generally maintaing the curb and pavement it is quite
difficult to get any semblance of balance between revenues from and costs of
meters. Our Indiana court allowed in one police regulation case26 recovery
of a license fee which brought great revenues to the city; the court counted
as expenses all costs resulting from the nature of the activity itself; excess
money from license fees for wagons was used to repair the streets.
Upon this last feature will probably arise the tremendous struggle. If the
court desires to invalidate the acts the writer submits that there is sufficient
authority for bringing about the desired result; on the other hand if there is
the desire to uphold the meter acts then the theory of "incidental revenue" may
well be employed. So far, only the Alabama court has given ear to this
attack;27 the Florida court hurdled the barrier. 28 What our court will do
remains to be seen upon the first test case being brought before it. W. E. 0.
SUBSTITUTIONARY RULE-FUTURE INTERESTs-LIFE EsTATE WITH GIrr OvEx oN
DEATH WrrHoUT IssuE-Testator devised all his realty to his wife for her life,
and subject to the wife's life estate to his adopted daughter, Olive, to have
and to hold the same for and during her natural life time only. Subject to
the aforesaid life estates, he devised the property absolutely and in fee simple
to the children of Olive, should she have any; but should she die without
children then the property is devised to his brothers and sisters or their
descendants. The widow elected to take under the law, and filed suit for
partition. The adopted daughter claims that having survived the testator,
and although she is unmarried and has no children, she takes a fee subject
only to defeasance in favor of her children upon their birth. The brothers and
sisters claim as contingent remainderman subject to the life estate of Olive
2122 Iowa L. R. 731, n. 91.
22Florida v. McCarthy (1936), 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314.
28 1 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1929), See. 27.
2 4Laundry License Case (1885), 22 F. 701; Stull v. Demattos (1900), 23
Wash. 71, 62 P. 451; State ex rel. City of Bozeman v. Police Ct. of Bozeman
(1923), 68 Mont. 436, 219 P. 810; State v. Caplan (1927), 100 Vt. 140,
135A. 705.
264 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1929), Sec. 1806, n. 66.
2 o Tomlinson v. Indianapolis (1896), 144 Ind. 142, 43 N. E. 9.
27 Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co. (1937), 233 Ala. 352, 172 So.
114.
28 Florida v. McCarthy (1936), 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314.
